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Abstract: Online shaming is a subject of import for social philosophy in the Internet age, and not 
simply because shaming seems generally bad. I argue that social philosophers are well-placed to address 
the imaginal relationships we entertain when we engage in social media; activity in cyberspace results in 
more relationships than one previously had, entailing new and more responsibilities, and our relational 
behaviors admit of ethical assessment. I consider the stresses of social media, including the indefinite 
expansion of our relationships and responsibilities, and the gap between the experiences of those 
shamed and the shamers’ appreciation of the magnitude of what they do when they shame; I connect 
these to the literature suggesting that some intuitions fail to guide our ethics. I conclude that we each 
have more power than we believe we do or than we think carefully about exerting in our online imaginal 
relations. Whether we are the shamers or the shamed, we are unable to control the extent to which 
intangible words in cyberspace take the form of imaginal relationships that burden or brighten our self-
perceptions.  
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These giants were being brought down by people who used to be powerless--- bloggers, anyone with a 
social media account. And the weapon that was felling them was a new one: online shaming. 
Jon Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed 
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Online shaming gets some exciting scholarly attention, yet searching for the phrase on a leading 
index for papers in philosophy yields no search results.1 As is sometimes the case with contemporary 
issues in social philosophy, when it comes to the applied ethics of online shaming we philosophers seem 
to be slow to contribute to ongoing and pressing conversations. And they are pressing; journalist Jon 
Ronson (2015) goes so far as to describe the 2010s as “a great renaissance of public shaming” (10). 
Noting examples of occasions on which he participated in public pressure brought to bear, via Twitter, 
on corporations that were moved to change public positions or policies, Ronson points out that “when 
we deployed shame, we were utilizing an immensely powerful tool. It was coercive, borderless, and 
increasing in speed and influence” (10). 
In this essay, I argue that the Internet age introduces new responsibilities for each of us, and not 
just a proliferation of old responsibilities; those new responsibilities include sorting out the extent to 
which we each have more power than we believe we do or than we think carefully about exerting, even 
as we exert it in online communication. The reaction of many regarding our new public powers is to 
avoid any online participation or to recommend avoidance to others (consider the popular injunction 
online, “Never read the comments!”). It is not obviously desirable to withdraw from public spaces and 
widely shared writing, however. I connect Ronson’s insights, that the magnitude of online shaming 
exceeds what its authors intend or even believe to be true, with psychologists’ development of the 
notion that we have imaginal relationships, in order to better identify our responsibilities as participants 
in cyberspace and as potential public shamers or victims of shaming.2 Social psychologists of imaginal 
relationships indicate that we all have relationships that we endow with imaginative content which 
includes their import, meaning, and membership.3 We can assess the extents to which these reflect 
reality, including the realities as to who we assume to be our actual and potential readers and whom we 
take as objects of our online writing. 
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Before proceeding, however, I consider a possible reason why we have been slow to bring 
philosophy to bear on the scholarship of online shaming: Isn’t the philosophical contribution sufficiently 
fulfilled with the recommendation, Don’t do that? Ethical recommendations against shaming and social 
punishment aren’t new, after all. Over 150 years ago, John Stuart Mill eloquently pointed out in On 
Liberty that society “practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, 
since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, 
penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself” ([1859] 1991, 9). His 
words seem timely in light of Ronson’s examples of those who were shamed online feeling “nervous and 
depressed,” reluctant to appear in public as hate mail and threats of violence arrived in their email and 
social media accounts (2015, 226). Mill urged some form of “protection . . . against the tyranny of the 
prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil 
penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them . . . a limit to 
the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence” ([1859] 1991, 9).4 In light 
of this passage, consider Ronson’s example of Justine Sacco, who published an arguably racist (or at 
least insensitive) joke on Twitter right before an international flight, then spent hours in the air and 
offline, unaware that as she traveled, her Tweet went viral, her employers were made aware of the 
international outrage at her offense, and social media users were alternately gleeful and furious. A 
Twitter user commented that the subject lost her job and friends while in the air; another user replied, 
“The Internet has spoken.”5  
In light of experiences like Sacco’s, Mill’s words ring true today. Some online shaming resembles 
the sort of social tyranny that he describes. Granted, there is a greater quantity of public shaming 
possible in cyberspace. The wider participant base in social media is permissive of a quantitative 
increase in ethically concerning cases. One could argue that quantitative increases in misbehavior and in 
population don’t necessarily call for new philosophical contributions to the cyberethics of online 
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shaming. Yet I suggest that, among other possibilities, online shaming is also a matter calling for the 
application of relational ethics. When one enters cyberspace, one enters into more relationships than 
one previously had. This, too, is perhaps a merely quantitative observation, but it is one yielding new 
and more responsibilities, and therefore risks.  
We ought to attend to those new relationships precisely because, as Ronson illustrates in detail, 
the magnitude of online shaming exceeds what its authors intend or even believe to be true. This is 
important observational data that illustrates the value of the philosophical scholarship showing that 
intuitions are not always a reliable guide to ethical behavior.6 Especially when one’s own implicit biases 
operate in one’s favor, the intuition is alluring that one’s use of Twitter to make jokes at the expense of 
a stranger cannot really be anything all that harmful. The happy assumption that one has a deep self 
that is good and true can result in remarkably exonerating judgments of subsequent deeds (Newman et 
al 2015). One’s internal and individualized intuitions are that one is a good person and not a bad person, 
so surely, one might feel when one’s fingers twitch toward one’s cell phone, one isn’t a contributor to 
distant harms or collective acts of wrongdoing. As Peter Unger argues, however, in a work tellingly 
subtitled, “Our Illusion of Innocence” (1996), psychological phenomena, such as the sense of distance 
from victims or uncertainty regarding the indefinite nature of targets, may ameliorate our individual 
feelings of responsibility without telling against our actual responsibilities. More recently, studies of 
moral self-licensing suggest that if one primes oneself to hold a positive conception of oneself, then one 
experiences less inhibition or guilt at subsequently norm-violating behavior (Merritt et al 2010). In short, 
our intuitions are not always the best guide to ethical behavior, and when our intuitions are the 
spontaneous products of biases, they may even include the comforting notion that a joke or tweet or 
comment in cyberspace is no big deal, harmless, just for fun among friends, at times when it is 
foreseeable that it is instead a contributor to bad consequences for others. 
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 The insights of philosophers and psychologists regarding our biases and the evidence that 
intuition is a misleading guide to ethics combine with new stresses for participants in cyberspace, 
including the stresses of the indefinite expansion of our relationships and responsibilities, and the gap in 
shamers’ appreciation of the effects of their shaming as compared to the experiences of those shamed.  
Taken together, the studies of individual susceptibility to bias and the relational nature of cyberspace 
ethics indicate that we each have more power than we believe we do or than we think carefully about 
exerting in a world-wide web of relations. As I explain later, the inattention to the vast quantity of our 
new relationships and the ease with which we can privately ignore the effects of our online participation 
leads to our cultivating imaginal relationships with some of those with whom we enter relationships 
online, at the expense of others. 
It is especially concerning to me that the magnitude gap is so stark in Ronson’s exploration; that 
is, there is some distance between the shamers’ perceptions of their objects’ great deservingness of 
harm and light suffering as a result of shaming, and the shamed persons’ experiences with actual harm 
and the deep and lingering effects of online shaming.  Consistently, Ronson reports that those who took 
to Twitter and other social media to shame someone expressed the conviction that the shamed are 
undoubtedly fine and suffered no lasting effects, while he also reports the experiences by the shamed of 
their longer-term losses of jobs and incomes, personal security, feelings of safety or trust, and 
reputations. Ronson himself does not refer to the gaping difference between shamers’ and targets’ 
perspectives as a magnitude gap. In using the term, I employ Roy Baumeister’s (1997) account of “the 
magnitude gap” (19), which occurs in a book on evil, but which he grants is at work in lesser wrongs, as 
well. Baumeister says, “The importance of what takes place is always much greater for the victim than 
the perpetrator” (18). He later adds, regarding what he calls cases of “instrumental evil,” that “the 
relationship is much more casual for the perpetrator than for the victim,” and “the perpetrator’s ability 
to hurt the victim is the central aspect of their relationship from the victim’s perpective” (124).  
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Baumeister contends that the perpetrator of instrumental evil wants something to which 
victims’ pains are merely means; building on his insight, I suggest that the wide audience of social media 
provides that which shamers really seek, that is, the social recognition on the part of other fellow 
shamers. After all, those who take to cyberspace to indulge in public shaming are doing something 
rather different than does a hacker determined to interfere stealthily with a target’s credit card or 
documents; the latter seems to have the actual harm of the target’s interests as the aim, but Ronson’s 
perpetrators seem either indifferent to their targets’ current states or in disbelief that they did anything 
with lasting ill effects. In other words, they seem remarkably disinterested both in the well-being and 
even in the presumably deserved suffering of the targets of online shaming. Perhaps the magnitude gap 
is so evident here because online shaming is a form of, if not Baumeister’s instrumental evil, then at 
least a relative, an Internet-age variety of instrumental cyber-mobbing for the further end of enjoying 
imaginal relations with fellow mobbers. While I appreciate the insights of Christopher Parsons (2012) 
that online shaming materially harms its targets, I do not find it to be true across cases that “the intent 
of shame justice . . . is to punish and exclude specific individuals” (3). In many cases, the intent of shame 
justice seems to be to enjoy the company one has in cyberspace with so many approving others. 
For this reason (among others), I believe that philosophers of relational ethics ought to draw 
attention to the imaginal relationships that a perpetrator of online shaming may enjoy with fellow 
shamers. The notion of imaginal relations is not new; it relies at least in part on Mary Watkins’ (1986) 
detailed account of imaginal dialogues as entailing imaginative development. Watkins argues that the 
imagination is derivative of and helpful to the real (1986, 32), and imaginal dialogues are constitutive of 
self-awareness, including a robust appreciation of how actual others see us (18). Drawing on Watkins’ 
conception of the imaginal dialogue, psychologists including Mary Gergen (2001) have developed 
arguments for imaginal relationships with absent and even deceased loved ones as continued bonds 
maintained by the living or the left-behind, especially through imaginal content. Maintaining 
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relationships with deceased others, on Gergen’s view, can include imaginal dialogues, considering what 
they would think of one’s behavior, identifying with the absent other. “To talk, laugh, and wonder, to be 
surprised, upset, hurt, angry, and amused, and to engage in other physical acts could all be a part of 
imaginal interactions,” Gergen adds (125). The shared outrage and shared enjoyment of Twitter users 
engaged in piling on to a target of online shaming bears out Gergen’s account of imaginal relations. A 
Twitter user may identify with indefinite others, and consider what they will think of one’s character-
limited tweets. 
Yet as media researcher Eden Litt has noted (2012), regarding the imagined audience, it is 
impossible to know the membership of social media audiences lacking privacy controls; she adds, 
“without being able to know the actual audience, social media users create and attend to an imagined 
audience for their everyday interactions” (333).  Like Watkins and Gergen, she appreciates the deep-
seated impulse to connect imaginatively even with cyber-relationships, noting, “the imagined audience,” 
that is, “the mental conceptualization of the people with whom we are communicating . . . is one of the 
most fundamental attributes of being human” (331). Therefore, it is not her view (or mine) that reliance 
on an imagined audience is bad; in some contexts it may be inevitable, a necessary substitute for one’s 
knowledge of, for example,  actual future job interviewers, or absent students, or current fellow citizens. 
Yet as Litt indicates, social media presents new challenges to the navigation of inevitably imagined 
audiences, many of which we were already navigating pre-Internet. Urging readers to attend better to 
the imagined audience in social media, Litt says, “The less an actual audience is visible or known, the 
more individuals become dependent on their imaginations” (331). And our imaginations will not extend 
equally to our relationships with everyone in cyberspace; in the case of online shaming, it seems that 
individuals who pile on to an opportunity to shame someone became vigorously engaged with their 
connections to fellow shamers, rather than to the object of their attentions.  
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This is more evident when considering the content of much online shaming. In one study 
comparing trends in the rhetoric of online shaming across three examples (including that of Justine 
Sacco), researchers found that three types of interaction predominated, categorized as “sarcasm or 
joke,” “passing judgment,” and “abuses” (Basak et al 2016, 12). The researchers add that their work may 
reveal “possible motives like one-upmanship, showing off righteousness,” and other social rewards, and 
they suggest that enlightening measurements of shamers’ motives could include “number of fo llowers 
and tendency to retweet” (12). This is instructive, as one’s number of Twitter followers and one’s 
tendency to amplify the posts of others are measures that reflect engagement in relationships with 
other Twitter users robustly, and seem to have little or nothing to do with the target of the jokes, 
judgments, and abuses. Further, in the first three days of a viral Twitter mobbing, those early and key 
days when participation by the wider user base is at its highest volume, researchers “observed that 
sarcasm or joke is the most popular form of shaming in Twitter, followed by passing judgment” (Basak et 
al 2016, 11). 
A joke is a social thing. In the case of online shaming, the extent to which Twitter users affirm 
each other at the expense of one target is a startling variation on Nancy Potter’s (2001) observation that 
“funniness is socially constituted and simultaneously constitutive of power relations” (106). After all, 
you’re not funny unless someone laughs. On Twitter, you know that your joke has landed or your 
sarcasm is acknowledged when it is liked, retweeted, and spread to other platforms of social media. In 
Potter’s work on humor (in the pages of this publication pre-Twitter), her efforts were dedicated to “a 
backdrop by which we can understand the role of humor among the disempowered when society and 
subjectivity are constituted by unequal power relations” (106). In this context, I have a different (and 
oddly related) worry; I’m concerned that the urge to pass judgment and the desire for connection and 
one’s own humor-appreciation provide the sense to online shamers that they are taking down, as 
Ronson said, “giants,” in a web of happy imaginal relationships with fellow non-giants, because the 
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shamers see themselves as the disempowered. The target of the shame is the one that needs to be 
“taken down,” a phrase that implicitly indicates the comforting narrative that the target of shame is up 
high, in a position of power that deserves to be brought down a peg. The metaphor is especially 
remarkable in light of the glee with which Twitter users reflected that Sacco, aboard her international 
flight, was literally up in the air while they mobbed her; tweets rapidly spread further narratives that 
supported the view that Sacco was of a high status, including the story that she was a rich “heiress to a 
$4.8 billion fortune, as people assumed her father was the South African mining tycoon Desmond 
Sacco,” which Ronson himself believed until he interviewed Sacco and learned that this was an error 
(2015, 67). The perception of Sacco as having high status might suggest that the target’s demise is the 
point of shaming, after all, but I suggest that the reduction of the target’s imagined high status is a 
necessary condition without being the purpose of the cyber-gathering. The purpose, often, is for 
shamers to feel that they are in league with each other. There must be a high-status target for the many 
to be in concert with each other, tilting at giants and enjoying the solidarity born of their successes.  
The imaginal relationships that provide a Twitter user with so much value are those a user has 
with the fellows who like the joke, who retweet the sarcasm, who affirm oneself. Considering Litt’s 
insight that the numbers of potential viewers of one’s words are so vast that one must rely on one’s 
imagination even more than if one’s readers were knowable, I find that the ethical assessment of users’ 
cultivation of these imaginal relations is complicated by questions as to whether a Twitter user can 
entirely help the cultivation of recognition, once received. Some imaginal relations are more voluntarily 
cultivated than others. We all have imaginal relations that we do not cultivate deliberately. For example, 
relationships with parents or parenting figures to an extent are simply imposed upon our consciousness 
early in life. Parents can live in our memories in ways that direct our conduct when absent, even call on 
ongoing responses in our heads or give us pause when we consider what they would think. We also have 
imaginal relations that we cultivate quite deliberately, such as when a teacher designs an assignment for 
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students (who are in the teacher’s mind but not present during design), or when a salesperson prepares 
a pitch to previously met clients. And we have imaginal relations that are mixed, at some times 
voluntarily and at others involuntarily built up in our heads, such as my relationships to “my fellow 
Americans,” or to future readers, or to my coworkers, regarding whom I may unavoidably bear hopes or 
fears, and regarding whom, on other occasions, I consciously form narratives and to whom I think about 
how to dispose my attitudes and future conduct. 
Online interactions seem to belong to the category of mixed, partly voluntary and partly 
involuntary interactions. The mixed nature of online relationships presents the risk of unmanageable 
problems; in contrast to early criticisms of social media that the relationships born in cyberspace must 
be transient or shallow things, I have the concern that the imaginal relationships partly sought and 
further reproduced on Twitter are produced when we cannot help thinking about and caring about the 
strong and positive reactions to our words online. One can make a joke on Twitter or a sarcastic 
judgment of another that no one notices. If a joke falls in cyberspace, it doesn’t make a sound. But the 
reactions that one gets if one’s joke or sarcasm gets viral uptake can outrun what one would expect, and 
then the powerful pull of social affirmation, of sudden solidarity, of agreement and even fellow fury can 
proliferate relationships that live in one’s mind with, as Benedict Anderson says, “the image of their 
communion” (1983, 5). The target of shame ceases to be the point when one is inundated with the 
responses of so many to something that seems so minor, a joke, a witticism at the expense of someone 
to whom one has no connection. I hope it is clear that I am not simply sketching a Twitter version of 
mob mentality. I do not much believe in such a thing. But I do believe evidence like that which Litt points 
to, indicating that we are constituted to mentally conceptualize those with whom we communicate, and 
I suggest that cyberspace presents possibly insurmountable challenges to our capacities to control those 
conceptualizations. The speed and volume of online affirmation outmatches what the human mind 
evolved to manage. Note that the inundation of affirmations is not always expected, yet it is foreseeable 
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given the nature of mass communication, so the imposition of the new imaginal relationships on one’s 
consciousness is an easily ignored moral risk. 
In all the social recognition that online shamers provide each other, unfortunately, the well-
being of the target is overlooked or reduced. Recipients of shaming, like Justine Sacco, are also living in 
the web of imaginal relationships. And imaginal relationship literature suggests that her shamers also 
live in her head, as she too may be forced to rely on her imagination and mentally conceptualize her 
detractors. In such situations, advising a victim of shaming to “ignore the trolls” is beyond pointless. 
Cheshire Calhoun (2016) argues that shame is rational even when we disagree with the assessment, and 
indicative of belonging in a human, moral community, a scheme of social cooperation (42). The advice to 
ignore the social community as it lives in one’s head is more than ineffective --- it’s missing the force. 
We are unable to control the extent to which intangible words in cyberspace take the form of imaginal 
relationships that burden or brighten our self-perceptions.  
Directives that when online, we ought to ignore or decline to engage with others are well-
intentioned, but they concern only a part of the online experience which we can control. My interest in 
this essay has been with the moral and psychological aspects of online life that exceed our control, as 
our mixed imaginal relationships do.7 If I am right that our self-concepts are influenced by imaginal 
relationships that outrun our capacities to manage their effects, then philosophical contributions to the 
literature on online shaming could include ethical recommendations grounded in the value and import 
of our imaginal relations. We can urge attention to the extent to which victims of shaming may not be 
able to simply ignore abusive words. We can argue for restraint in one’s own impulses to post sarcasm 
or jokes on popular topics for the reason that one should ask oneself whose approval one seeks in so 
joking. And we can base prescriptions to reduce forms of one’s participation in social media on the 
evidence that the mental conceptualizations one enjoys of one’s imagined audience are far outstripped 
by the potential community waiting to move into one’s consciousness.  
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The latter prescription is not intended to suggest that we should get out of cyberspace after all. 
Forms of social media continue to evolve and expand in importance, and there is some truth in Ronson’s 
observation that in the early days of Twitter, “it felt as if hierarchies were being dismantled, as if justice 
were being democratized,” especially when they targeted “powerful institutions and public figures” 
rather than “anyone perceived to have done something offensive” (2015a). Public speaking should not 
and will not be kept only in the hands of those with power in the foreseeable future. We can neither 
wish away the Internet, nor ignore all of the effects of cyberspace speech. And we can sometimes use 
the less hierarchical and more democratized forms of mass communication for good. But we should do 
so with concerted attention to the uncontrollable aspects of the tool we employ, and the effects that, 
though we may not intend them, we are complicit in inducing in others or entirely responsible for 
bringing about. Reasonably foreseeable harms are only foreseeable if we take the time to look. 
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my purposes, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; more recently, see Weijers 2013 and Brownstein and Saul 2016.  
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